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In 2004, ten new states entered the European Union. Relative to the pre-2004 member 
states, these accession states have lower environmental standards, and some worry that 
it will be too demanding for these new EU members to fully comply with European 
environmental provisions. In this paper, we assess one rationale for such harmonization. 
Specifically, we analyze the determinants of environmental policies’ stringency, and 
show that differences in corruption levels are more important as explanatory factor 
when compared to income differentials. Since high levels of corruption characterize 
some countries in the enlarged EU, we argue that this is a good reason for an upward 
harmonization of environmental policies at the EU level. 
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1. Introduction 
For decades the European Union (EU) has developed a growing body of environmental policies. The 
first piece of European legislation on environmental issues dates 1959, when a directive on radiation 
safety  standards  was  emanated  (Tamara,  1997).  In  1972,  the  European  Community  instructed  the 
Commission to draw the First Environmental Action Program (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997), the first 
comprehensive environmental policy initiative. The attention for environmental protection is apparent, 
also from its explicit mentioning in recent treaties such as the “Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing  the  European  Community”  (emended  in  Maastricht,  1992)  and  “Treaty  on  European 
Union” (also know as Maastricht Treaty, 1992). In the European Union’s Constitution – signed on the 
29
th of October 2004 – sustainable development and “a high level of protection and improvement of the 
quality of the environment” are mentioned already in the first article among the main objectives of the 
Union. 
In 2004, ten new states entered the EU: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Relative to the pre-2004 or ‘old’ member states, these 
accession states have lower environmental standards, and some worry that it will be too demanding for 
these new EU members to fully comply with European environmental provisions. Yet, a remarkable 
effort  has  been  undertaken  by  the  EU  in  order  to  secure  compliance  nonetheless.  In  the  Act  of 
Accession of the ten new members, among the permanent provisions, there is a list of environmental 
issues on which there is the need of adopting and implementing the EU environmental acquis
3 at the 
national level. 
But, the case for European Union’s environmental policies cannot be taken for granted. One of 
the European Union characteristics is the heterogeneity of its members. In the environmental sphere 
this has introduced fears of excessive regulations that could be damaging welfare levels as they detract 
resources that could be devoted to more urgent needs according to national priorities. As it is generally 
accepted that demand for environmental quality (as a normal good) increases with income, there is an 
argument that poorer countries prefer to opt for laxer environmental policies, avoiding the investment 
in environmental protection of an unduly high share of their income. This type of reasoning gains 
further relevance as the new member states have, on the average, a lower level of income than older 
member  states.  Therefore,  preferences  among  EU  states  will  be  further  diversified  –  because  of 
increasing differences in income levels – and some countries, in the enlarged EU, will be less sensitive 
towards environmental issues.
4 Moreover, environmental issues and ecological conditions differ from 
country to country and a uniform approach to environmental policies can have disproportionately high 
costs for some countries without producing adequate benefits (Haigh, 1992). 
                                                       
3 Acquis Communautaire is the expression used, in European Union law, to refer to the whole of the regulations 
accumulated over time in the EU. 
4 See Tefertilles, 2001 for similar arguments used in a US context.   3
At  the  same  time,  there  are  various  arguments  that  explain  the  EU  effort  to  protect 
environmental quality equally in old and new member states. The most fundamental one – which is 
cited most often in official documents (such as the above mentioned treaties) – is that the EU is more 
than  a  group  of  countries  harmonizing  their  regulations  in  order  to  exploit  the  access  to  a  larger 
common market. The European Union is a political subject and the welfare of the EU citizens is at the 
center of its concerns; it has an active attitude towards countries that are lagging behind in defending 
the interests of their citizens and the political project of the EU, and these countries are to some extent 
forced to catch up with the European aquis. This EU stand is clearly present in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Another argument, non-specific to the EU as a political object, is that many environmental 
problems have transboundary effects on neighboring countries. In the case of these pollutants, the EU is 
an obvious forum for member countries to regulate these sorts of externalities. On a similar ground, as 
the EU is an integrated market, the application of different environmental policies that result in cost 
differentials  among  countries  would  promote  the  transfer  of  polluting  production  activities  from 
countries with more stringent policies to countries with looser environmental policies (Andersen and 
Liefferink,  1997  and  Weale  et  al.,  2000:  34–37).  The  introduction  of  differentiated  policies  in  an 
integrated market would produce pollution leakage: the environment would not benefit optimally from 
the environmental protective provisions and the most environmentally concerned countries would be 
economically harmed. 
There is ample evidence that income affects environmental policies. Pellegrini and Gerlagh 
(2005) provide econometric estimates for the – expected – positive relationship between income and 
environmental policy stringency. At the same time, the authors highlight a main role for corruption in 
shaping the stringency of environmental policies. In this paper, we reproduce some estimates of the 
determinants of environmental policy stringency and we relate them to the realm of environmental 
policies in the EU. Through further statistical analysis, this paper argues that applying these findings to 
the  environmental  arena  in  the  EU  underscores  the  rationale  for  the  Union’s  interventions  in 
environmental policies, including the provision of higher environmental standards in the new member 
states. It also supports the EU active role in environmental policies, as citizens’ concerns are often 
better served at the EU level, compared to the country level where environmental protection is more 
often affected by domestic corruption. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section gives an account of the academic discussion on 
the determinants of environmental policy stringency and it presents some econometric results; the third 
section puts in relation environmental policies with institutional settings in the EU; the fourth section – 
drawing from the preceding analysis – discusses the implications of our findings for EU’s stand on 
environmental policies and it concludes.   4
2. Determinants of environmental policy stringency 
Economic theory suggests that the environment (or environmental quality) can be treated either as a 
normal or as a luxury good: its demand increases with income. Increased demand of environmental 
quality for high-income levels is one of the main explanations backing the Environment Kutznets Curve 
(EKC,  Grossman  and  Krueger,  1995),  the  commonly  observed  path  along  which  environmental 
degradation is on the rise jointly with income growth for low levels of income, while after a turning 
point, further increases in income correspond to increases in environmental quality levels. One of the 
arguments  explaining  the  inverted–U  income–pollution  relationship  is  the  increased  demand  for 
environmental quality caused by increases in income, together with an assumed policy response (for a 
discussion see Roca, 2004). 
Other  literature  strands  have  highlighted  the  effects  of  institutional  settings  on  building 
environmental policies. For example, the linkages among democracy and the environment have been 
discussed many times (Payne, 1995; Neumayer, 2002). Likewise, the literature has also analyzed the 
effects of corruption on the formulation and implementation of environmental policies (Lopez, and 
Mitra, 2000; Damania, 2002). 
Recently, a strand of empirical literature has developed on the determinants of environmental quality 
(the above mentioned EKC is one example) and also estimates have been produced on the determinants 
of  environmental policies  (for  a recent review  see  Pellegrini and  Gerlagh, 2005).  From a political 
economy perspective it is no surprise to find that environmental policies are affected by the quality of 
governance structures. When environmental regulation harms economically-endowed and concentrated 
interests, those affected negatively can easily raise funds to bribe policy makers and bureaucrats in 
order  to  deter  the  emanation  of  costly  regulations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  benefits  of  most 
environmental policies are common goods affecting the polity at large, thus common citizens face a 
coordination problem when they would need to collect resources for buying influence in order to have 
the environmental regulations enacted. There is thus a need for high-quality government that puts the 
polity’s interest at its focus, and that prevents self-interested policy makers from maximizing their own 
benefits,  which  would  make  them  relatively  insensible  to  polity’s  demands  for  increases  in  the 
stringency of environmental policy. The argument applies both to making of environmental regulation 
and the enforcement of written policy. 
2.1. Cross–country evidence 
First we produce econometric estimates of the determinants of stringency of environmental policies in a 
cross-section of countries. Subsequently, we focus on the set of countries that are within the sphere of 
influence of EU’s environmental policies, i.e. old and new members, and candidate countries. 
Using two sets of indexes of the stringency of environmental policy, Pellegrini and Gerlagh 
(2005) find, in two cross-sections of countries referring to two different time frames, that the main   5
determinant of environmental policies is the country’s level of corruption. Firstly, the authors carry out 
regressions  that  identify  the  determinants  of  the  index  of  Environmental  Policy  Stringency  (EPS), 
which refers to the year 1991 and is based on data gathered for the UN summit in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992 (see also Eliste and Fredriksson, 2002). Secondly, they perform a similar econometric analysis for 
the Environmental Regulatory Regime Index (ERRI), which was compiled in 2002 and is based on a 
sub-set of the indexes forming the Environmental Sustainability Index, augmented by data from the 
competitiveness survey of the World Economic Forum (see also Esty and Porter, 2002). Both these 
indexes  refer  to  environmental  policies  in  an  extensive  way:  from  the  stringency  of  the  stated 
objectives,  to  the  available  information  on  environmental  qualities,  to  the  existence  of  institutions 
implementing them, and the quality of the regulatory framework. Moreover, the ERRI also looks at the 
actual share of environmental expenditures in the budget of firms in different countries. 
In this paper, we present an econometric analysis on the determinants of the stringency of 
environmental policies making use of ERRI as a dependent variable. The choice of this indicator of the 
stringency of environmental policies is based on the fact that all European countries are included in the 
sample of countries for which the index is available. Furthermore, the base year for the EPS is 1991 and 
the former communist countries of Eastern Europe underwent dramatic institutional and environmental 
policies changes over the last decade. The ERRI, which is compiled for the year 2001, is more relevant 
for the actual environmental policy of Europe.
5 For this index, and for the other variables, see Table 1 
for the descriptive statistics. 
Furthermore, we use, as a proxy of corruption levels, the Corruption Perception Index gathered 
by  Transparency  International.
6  The  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  is  a  composite  index  based  on 
interviews of ‘credible’ sources (Lambsdorff, 2001). The scores of the index range from 0 to 10, where 
a low (high) score indicates low (high) levels of corruption.
7 The income proxy is the natural logarithm 
of GDP, adjusted for purchasing power parity, from Summers and Heston database
8 and refers to the 
year 1997. 
In  order  to  estimate  the  influences  of  income  and  corruption  on  the  formulation  and 
implementation of environmental policies, we estimate the following regression: 
 
                                                       
5  An  extensive  econometric  analysis  similar  to  the  one  undertaken  here,  but  including  EPS  as  a  dependent 
variable, can be found in Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2005. The authors used a slightly different time frames and 
variables in their analysis. Most  notably, they estimated also the effects  of democracy on  policy stringency, 
including a democracy index in their regressions. Here the democracy variable is omitted as there is little variation 
in the value of the democracy indexes within European countries and because the democracy variable –from the 
Polity IV project– was not significant in any of our regressions. 
6 The data are available at http://www.transparency.org/ 
7 For a summary of advantages, and disadvantages, of perceptive corruption indexes cfr. P. Mauro 1997, p. 83. 
8 The data are available at http://datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt/   6
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where the superscript i denotes each country in the sample, ERRI is the Environmental Regulatory 
Regime Index, Y is income per capita in 1997, Corr is the Corruption Perception Index referring to 
2001. Finally, Z is a vector of additional explanatory variables that are introduced in order to check the 
robustness of our findings. 
The results of the regressions are reported in Table 2. Regression (1), showing the correlation 
between income and environmental policy, reproduces the finding we expect from economic theory: 
richer  countries  tend  to  have  more  stringent  environmental  policies.  The  income  variable  has  a 
statistically significant coefficient and a one standard deviation in the value of the income variable is 
associated with an increase of the environmental policy index by more than 0.8 standard deviations.
9  
In Regression (2), once we include the corruption variable, we notice a drastic drop in the 
absolute value of the coefficient of the income variable: from 2.5 to 0.5. Also the statistical significance 
is  reduced  and  the  coefficient  is  significant  only  at  5%.  At  the  same  time,  the  coefficient  on  the 
corruption variable is sizeable in magnitude and is highly significant. Now, corruption turns out to be 
more important, as in this regression, a one standard deviation change in corruption is associated with a 
0.8 standard deviation change in the ERRI. A comparison of the two first regressions suggests that the 
coefficient of the income variable from Regression (1) is inflated by an omitted variable bias. When the 
income and corruption proxies are included together in the regression, the effect of corruption appears 
to  dominate  the  effect  of  income.  Further  evidence  of  the  association  between  corruption  and 
environmental policy is provided by the scatterplot in Figure 1, were we plot the ERRI variable against 
the corruption perception index. 
                                                       
9 We interpret some of the results in standardised terms: we consider what change, in standard deviation terms, in 
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FIGURE 1 Scatterplot for Corruption and the Environmental Regulatory Regime Index. The regression 
line is estimated to fit all countries in the sample, not only EU countries.  
 
 
In Regression (3) schooling and urbanization are included as explanatory variables, following Pellegrini 
and  Gerlagh,  2005.  The  schooling  variable  expresses  the  number  of  years  spent  at  school,  on  the 
average, for the population above 25 years old in 2000.
10 The urbanization variable is the percentage of 
the total population that lives in urban areas in 1999.
11 In general we would expect that the schooling 
variable would have  a positive bearing on environmental policy  stringency: the more educated the 
population, the more aware the citizens are about environmental problems. Moreover, a more educated 
polity will better be able to scrutinize measures that policy makers put in place to tackle environmental 
issues. The coefficient of the schooling variable is indeed positive, but it is very small in absolute terms 
and  insignificant.  The  urbanization  variable  has  a  non–clear  predicted  effect.  On  the  one  hand, 
increased urbanization is associated with more concentrated population and urban citizens can more 
easily co-operate in order to push policy makers to undertake measures, such as setting environmental 
                                                       
10 The data are from the Barro–Lee ‘International data on educational attainment’ dataset (version updated to 
April 2000) and are available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html 
11 From the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.   8
standards,  that  satisfy  their  preferences.  On  the  other  hand,  a  highly  urbanized  population,  more 
detached from nature, may be less interested in environmental protection. In our analysis, we find some 
weak  evidence  of  the  second  effect  to  dominate;  the  coefficient  on  urbanization  is  negative,  but 
significant only at about 10% level (see also Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2005). A side effect of these 
additional  variables  is  the  increased  size  and  statistical  significance  of  the  coefficient  of  income, 
whereas the corruption coefficient is not affected substantially.  
In  Regression  (4)  a  dummy  variable  is  included  to  verify  whether  there  is  a  residual  in 
environmental policy stringency specific for the pre-2004 EU members. Indeed, the EU members seem to 
have slightly stricter environmental policies: the coefficient on the EU dummy is positive though it is 
only significant at just above 10%. An obvious argument explaining this higher stringency for the EU is 
the Union’s environmental policy that we outlined above. The EU has pushed environmental policy 
laggards to adopt stricter policies more in line with the forerunners. We notice that again the coefficient 
on the corruption variable is only slightly affected by the inclusion of additional explanatory variables. 
 
TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Min  Max 
ERRI   4.2   2.5   0.0  10.0 
Income (ln GDP/cap)   9.0   0.8   6.9  10.3 
Corruption   5.0   2.4   0.1   9.6 
Schooling   7.7   2.4   2.4  12.2 
Urbanization   0.7   0.2  0.2   1.0 
Descriptive statistics for the 66 observations sample (as in Regression (2)). 
 
Overall, the econometric evidence presented here suggests, in line with previous findings, that 
corruption levels negatively affect the stringency of environmental policies. Our estimates suggest that, 
at a cross-country level, a one standard deviation decrease in the corruption variable is associated with a 
more than two-thirds improvement in the Environmental Regulatory Regime Index. This association 
appears to be highly statistically significant. The income variable is associated with less variation of the 
Environmental Regulatory Regime Index; a one standard deviation increase in the income proxy is 
associated  with  0.16 times  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  the  ERRI  in  regression  (4),  and the 
statistical significance ranges from 5 to 10%. 
   9
TABLE 2. Regressions as in equation (1) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Independent Variables 
ERRI  ERRI  ERRI  ERRI  ERRI 
Income           2.51*** 
      (12.65) 
         0.51** 
        (2.00) 
         0.69** 
        (2.23) 
         0.47* 
        (1.71) 
     1.93** 
    (2.82) 
Corruption          –0.80***  
      (8.46) 
      –0.79*** 
       (7.57) 
      –0.75*** 
       (6.56) 
    –0.61*** 
    (3.52) 
Schooling               0.06  
         (0.63) 
         0.12  
        (1.06) 
     0.32*** 
    (2.99) 
Urbanization             –1.40*   
        (1.67) 
       –1.34* 
        (1.69) 
    0.72   
   (0.33) 
Old EU members                  0.68 
        (1.59)   
R
2  0.70  0.86  0.87  0.87  0.88 
Number of countries  69      66      59     59      21     
OLS estimation with the Environmental Regulatory Regime Index as dependent variable. Old EU members is a 
dummy variable for pre-2004 EU members. The constants are included in the regressions, but the coefficients are 
omitted from the table. Superscripts *, **,  *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1% of significance, respectively. t-
statistics, based on robust standard errors, are in parenthesis under the coefficients. Regression (4), our favourite 
model, passes the RESET test (checking for misspecifications), does not have outliers with high leverage and the 
variance  inflation  factor  is  lower  than  10  for  every  variable  (indicating  that  multicollinerity  is  not  a  major 
problem).   
 
It is important to highlight that many of our independent variable are highly correlated and this 
can cause multicollinearity. This is most obvious when in regression (3) we introduce the schooling 
variable and the urbanization variable. These variables are correlated between themselves and they are 
highly correlated with income levels (see Table 3). This results in an inflation of the coefficients of 
these variables, and a decrease in statistical significance. Given our sample size, this could be a serious 
problem when we try to disentangle the effects of the individual variables on environmental policy. It is 
important to note, however, that the purpose of this paper is not to provide statistical evidence on the 
whole  range  of  possible  determinants  of  environmental  policy,  but  to  test  the  importance  of 
corruption’s influence versus income and to evaluate the impact of corruption and income within the 
EU countries. Stated positively, the fact that the corruption variable continues to be highly significant in   10
all our regressions is even more remarkable and can be considered as an extreme test for the relevance 
of corruption for environmental policy stringency.
12 
 
TABLE 3. Correlations 
  ERRI  Income  Corruption  Schooling  Urbanization 
ERRI  1.00  0.86  –0.92  0.73  0.55 
Income  .  1.00  –0.87  0.78  0.65 
Corruption      1.00  –0.76  0.63 
Schooling        1.00  0.60 
Urbanization          1.00 
Correlations. All the variables in the table are correlated at 1% level of significance. Number of observations: 59 
 
3. Environmental policies and institutions in the EU 
Now we turn to the implications of the previous analysis for environmental policies in the EU. From 
Figure 1 we can see that European countries align on the global regression line.
13 In this section we will 
describe the efforts (and the shortcomings) of the EU to induce the new member and the candidate 
countries to tackle corruption before accession. We will also briefly touch upon the (lack of a coherent) 
effort of the EU on this issue with respect to older members. Furthermore, we will apply the results of 
the previous analysis in order to estimate the effect of corruption on the stringency of environmental 
policy for European countries.  
3.1. The accession process and its review: focus on corruption 
The progress made, by candidate and accession countries, towards the integration in the EU has been 
assessed through regular reports. The core of the criteria used for single country evaluations are the so–
called “Copenhagen criteria” (set in 1993 at the Copenhagen European Council).
14 Part of the first 
                                                       
12 In any case, when we calculated the variance inflation factor, in Regression (4), it was never higher than 6 (the 
conventional value for signaling serious multicollinearity is 10), and the variables income and corruption were the 
variables with the highest values. 
13 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia are the 
new EU members and candidates for which the ERRI is available. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom are the pre-2004 EU 
members for which the ERRI is available. 
14 The criteria are usually broadly divided in three categories: the political criteria, the economic criteria and the 
criteria  of  adoption  of  the  acquis.  The  political  criteria  refers  to  the  stability  of  institutions  guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the economic criteria 
demands the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure   11
criterion  is  the  establishment  of  the  ‘rule  of  the  law’,  which  is  not  compatible  with  widespread 
corruption. In this light, the reports compiled by the Commission on which the decision ‘if and when’ 
the countries would be ready to access the Union have always included corruption levels and trends 
thereof as central issues. 
The  EU’s  assessments  of  corruption  levels  and  trends  have  been  criticized  both 
methodologically  and,  even  more  seriously,  for  its  content  (Open  Society  Institute,  2002).  The 
assessment by the commission is said to lack a coherent framework and the information used for the 
assessment  of  countries’  performances  are  derived  from  different  sources  and  are  compiled  with 
different  methodologies.  For  example,  in  some  country  reports  opinion  pools  have  been  used  as 
evidence for assessing corruption levels, while in other country reports experts’ opinions, or even the 
actual number of convictions have been used. Furthermore, these sources have changed between years, 
and such does not support comparison of assessments over time.  
From a more substantial point of view, the lack of a clear benchmark and the weakness of the 
pressure to tackle corruption are apparently motivated by the fact that some pre-2004 member states 
would not be able to comply with strict anticorruption frameworks (Open Society Institute, 2002). 
According  to most  surveys, the least  corrupted of  the  new  members  do  better  than  some  of  EU’s 
founding members. Specifically, according to the Corruption Perception Index 2004, Malta, Estonia, 
Slovenia and Cyprus are all affected by a lower degree of corruption compared to Italy and Greece. 
Already  the  Commission  has  been  pushing  new  members  and  candidate  countries  to  undertake 
initiatives to counteract corruption whereas member states have been reluctant to adopt these same 
regulations. A good example is the ratification of the ‘Criminal Law Convention on Corruption’, which 
the Commission has pressed applicant countries to sign and ratify. As of July 2004, all new members 
and candidates have ratified it, while 6 out of 15 pre-2004 members still have not ratified it and Spain 
even did not sign it.
15 Greece and Italy, the member countries that have the worst rating in the above-
mentioned  Corruption  Perception  Index  2004,  are  among  the  countries  that  did  not  ratify  the 
convention.  From  this  perspective  it  is  easy  to  understand  why  the  Commission  cannot  press  the 
applicant countries too much to fight corruption. 
Notwithstanding these  caveats, the EU’s requirements for accession have induced new and 
candidate members to undertake several initiatives in order to limit corruption. All the new member 
states have signed and ratified international conventions and modified their domestic legislation in 
order to fulfill the formal requirements of the EU. Nevertheless, it is at the implementation levels that 
many countries have failed to meet the standards of the EU. 
Most notably, in the case of Romania’s 2004 Regular Report (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2004) the picture of progress made to improve on corruption levels – which are rather 
                                                                                                                                                                         
and market forces within the Union; the criteria of adoption of the acquis relates to the ability to take on the 
obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
15 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=173&CM=7&DF=06/07/04&CL=ENG   12
high – was considered unsatisfactory. A passage deserves a long citation: “corruption remains a serious 
and widespread problem in Romania which affects almost all aspect of society. There has been no 
reduction  in  perceived  levels  of  corruption  and  the  number  of  successful  prosecutions  are  low, 
particularly for high-level corruption. The fight against corruption is hampered by integrity problems 
even  within  institutions  that  are  involved  in  law  enforcement  and  the  fight  against  corruption” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2004: 21). Furthermore, it must be noted that the report 
was published on the same day when the Commission confirmed that – thanks to its progress towards 
integration – Romania’s accession date is confirmed to be the 1
st of January 2007. 
Looking at the overall corruption levels in new and candidate EU countries, the record of corruption 
that is depicted by the statistics of Transparency international is discouraging. From Table 4 we see that 
on the average, their score equals 5.7, while the older members of the EU score 2.5. This equals a 
difference of one standard deviation on the global scale. 
3.2. New and old member and candidate states of the EU: environmental policies and 
corruption levels 
Regression (5) in Table 2 presents the statistical evidence on income, corruption and environmental 
policy stringency in the enlarged EU, where also the urbanization and schooling variables are included 
without affecting the significance of the corruption variable. Though regression results with such a 
small sample of countries as in regression (5) should be interpreted carefully, together with the global 
regressions, a robust pattern appears. When we compare the coefficients for the EU estimation with the 
world-wide  cross-country  evidence  –  that  we  presented  above  –  we  see  that  the  dynamic  of 
environmental  policies  within  the  EU  and  the  candidate  countries  reflect  the  global  patterns,  and 
specifically, we find that corruption dominates as a (negative) determinant of environmental policy 
stringency levels. 
Figure 2 portrays this insight. For this figure, we adjusted the ERRI for income (using the 
coefficients from Regression (5), and plotted the adjusted ERRI values against corruption levels. The 
figure  shows  a  strong  correlation  between  the  corruption  variable  and  the  environmental  policy 
stringency index. Also, we see a clear negative effect of corruption on the stringency of environmental 
policies.  Overall,  the  new  members  and  candidate  countries  are  grouped  at  the  right-hand  side 
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FIGURE 2. Scatterplot with the Environmental Regulatory Regime Index (adjusted for income) on the y-
axis and corruption on the x-axis.  
 
To apply the figure to policy, we put in some numbers. For corruption, the gap between the 
average performance of the old members of the EU and the new and candidate members is 3.2 (5.7 – 
2.5, see Table 4). This gap is substantially larger than the standard deviation of the corruption level 
within each of the groups of the old and new EU members, which is 1.6 and 0.9, respectively (Table 4). 
Thus,  the  variance  between  the  groups exceeds the  variance  within the groups  by  consequence.  If 
Poland were to improve its corruption index (5.9) to the level of Germany (2.7), on basis of this change 
alone, we would expect its environmental performance as measured by the ERRI variable to improve by 
2.1 points.
16 When Poland would also increase its income level, from 8,140 euro per capita (in 1997) to 
19,970 euro per capita (the average income of old EU members in 1997), this would increase the 
expected ERRI variable by 1.7.
17 Thus, for Poland, catching up with EU low corruption levels can be 
expected to have more effects on its environmental policies than catching up with EU welfare levels.  
The effect would be even stronger when applied to the most corrupt country of the candidates: 
Romania. If this country were to catch up and improve its corruption index to the average of the pre-
                                                       
16 We multiply 2.5–5.9=–3.4 with –0.61 from Regression (5). 
17 We multiply ln(8,140)–ln(19,970)=–0.9 with –1.93 from Regression (5).   14
2004 EU members (that is, reducing the corruption index from 7.2 to 2.5) it would improve its ERRI by 
2.9 points.
18 This alone would improve its position from the 24th position to the 20th in our sample of 
EU countries.  
It must be noted that these calculations are based on coefficients from regression (5) and they 
tend to be conservative; they will probably give too low a weight to the importance of corruption, 
compared to the effect of income increases. When we apply the coefficients from regression (4), which 
are based on the largest set of countries for which we have all data, we see that the role of corruption 
becomes more important relative to the role of income. In general, we consider regression (4) more 
reliable, because of the larger sample and of the reduced role for outliers, but we decided to use the 
coefficients  from  regression  (5)  to  make  a  conservative  calculation  on  corruption’s  impact  on 
environmental policy. 
 
TABLE 4. Descriptive statistics for EU countries 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Min  Max 
ERRI (old members)  6.86  2.04  2.54  10.00 
ERRI (new members and candidates)  3.78  1.21  0.89  4.88 
Corruption (old members)  2.54  1.58  0.1  5.8 
Corruption (new members and candidates)  5.73  0.91  4.4  7.2 
Income (old members)  9.89  0.18  9.49  10.12 
Income (new members and candidates)  9.01  0.36  8.44  9.53 
Descriptive statistics for old EU members (14 countries in our sample) and new members together with 
candidates (10 countries in our sample), as used for Regression (5). 
 
4. Conclusions 
The accession to the European Union of ten new member states and the likely future membership of 
more countries – which are presently at the candidate stage – represents a formidable challenge for the 
institutions of the EU. The enlargement not only has created a more economically, environmentally, 
and socially diverse EU; the new countries – on the average – are also affected by corruption to a 
higher  degree  than  the  pre-2004  members  and  their  progress  towards  an  improvement  of  their 
corruption  records  has  produced  mixed  results.  In  this  section  we  highlight  the  effects  of  these 
differences on environmental policies concluding that corruption’s influence on environmental policy 
                                                       
18 We multiply 7.2–2.5=–4.7 with –0.61 from Regression (5).   15
stringency  provides  a  further  rationale  for  the  formulation  and  implementation  of  environmental 
policies at the EU level. 
The EU enlargement is easily used as an argument to restrict the role of environmental policies 
because  of  the  increase  in  variation  in  socio-economic  and  cultural  conditions.  The  presence  of 
different  income  levels  provides  impetus  to  those  who  argue  for  a  reduced  role  of  supranational 
environmental  policies.  Poorer  countries  should  pursue  economic  objectives  first  and  only  then 
concentrate on environmental quality. Also, increasingly different preferences among EU’s citizens 
towards the environment are likely to arise. Added to income differences, the root of differences in 
preferences can also lay in variation in culture. It can be argued that each country should be allowed to 
pursue  its  own  way  in  order  to  achieve  higher  welfare  standards  according  to  its  own  cultural 
preferences. Finally, the enlargement process also implies an increase in environmental diversity. Thus, 
while  some  environmental  measures  are  considered  necessities  in  some  countries,  they  may  be 
superfluous in other countries that have a different environment.
19 
But,  these  arguments  in  favor  of  an  allowed  diversity  in  environmental  policies  too  easily 
neglect a major cause for this diversity, the difference in institutional quality among the countries. 
Given the numerical results presented above, it is more likely that environmental policies in new EU 
member states are at a low level because of institutional failure, than that this diversity is caused by 
heterogeneous preferences of residents. The EU environmental provisions could therefore be seen as a 
correction of national policy failures. Moreover, as corruption is a pervasive phenomenon, it will take a 
long period for the new EU member states to catch up with average EU levels, and enforcement of 
higher environmental standards, can then be understood as an early reaping of the fruits thereof. 
Stated  the  other  way  around,  concern  for  environmental  quality  is  an  additional  reason  to 
improve institutional quality in the new and candidate member states, and not to wait for an income 
increase. From an optimistic perspective, we should point out that improving a country’s institutional 
quality may render a double dividend when it will be beneficial for environmental quality, as well as for 
economic  growth,  thus  improving  societal  welfare  two  times.  Evidence  strongly  suggests  that 
corruption has negative effects on economic development (Mauro, 1995, Mo, 2001). When a decrease 
in corruption levels leads to cumulating high growth rates, environmental policy will improve through 
both the direct channel (captured in the statistical analysis above) and the indirect income channel. 
Indeed, the evidence seems sufficiently clear to conclude that the enlarged EU can and should serve as 
a forum for the advancement and the diffusion of more progressive and stringent environmental policies 
among member countries (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997).  
                                                       
19  For  an  example  on cross-country  differences  on  opportunities and  costs  of  paper  recycling  see  Berglund, 
Soderholm and Nilsson (2002).   16
 
Appendix. Data 
  ERRI  Income  Corruption  Schooling  Urbanization 
Old EU members 
Austria  8.31  21716  2.20  8.80  0.65 
Belgium  7.08  21845  3.40  8.73  0.97 
Denmark  7.66  24776  0.50  10.09  0.85 
Spain  5.24  16141  3.00  7.25  0.77 
Finland  10.00   20671  0.10  10.14   0.67 
France  7.86  20511  3.30  8.38  0.75 
United Kingdom  7.15  20710  1.70  9.35  0.89 
Germany  8.01  21379  2.60  9.75  0.87 
Greece  2.54  13186  5.80  8.52  0.60 
Ireland  5.52  20323  2.50  9.02  0.59 
Italy  5.39  20878  4.50  7.00  0.67 
Netherlands  8.58  22145  1.20  9.24  0.89 
Portugal  4.05  14023  3.70  4.91  0.63 
Sweden  8.65  21266  1.00  11.36   0.83 
New Members 
Czech Republic  4.31  13454  6.10  9.46  0.75 
Estonia  4.88   8230  4.40  -  0.69 
Hungary  4.85  9110  4.70  8.81  0.64 
Lithuania  3.75  6825  5.20  -  0.68 
Latvia  4.03  6698  6.60  -  0.69 
Poland  4.14  8142  5.90  9.90  0.65 
Slovakia  3.67  10556  6.30  9.19  0.57 
Slovenia  4.66  13786  4.80  7.35  0.50 
Candidate Members 
Bulgaria  2.63  5456  6.10  9.74  0.69 
Romania  0.89  4639  7.20  9.51  0.56 
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